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1 Introduction
Explaining the educational outcomes of children is one of the most challenging questions
faced by economists. Most studies have found that school quality (e.g., Card and Krueger,
1992, 1996, and Hanushek, 2002) and family background (e.g., Ermisch and Francesconi,
2001, Sacerdote, 2002, Plug and Vijverberg, 2003) have a significant and positive impact
on the level of education of children.1 However, the eﬀect of neighborhood quality seems
to be less clear (see e.g., Durlauf, 2004). For example, Solon et al. (2000), Oreopolous
(2003), and the papers using the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) programs (like e.g. Katz
et al., 2001) find little evidence of neighborhood eﬀects on education. The general consensus
seems to be that the neighborhood where individuals grow up is of importance, although the
eﬀects are not large after controlling for individual and family characteristics and parental
selection of residential neighborhood. The main open question is whether family background
and, in particular, parental education, do proxy for more subtle mechanisms responsible
for intergenerational persistence. When the data provide information on the diﬀerences in
attitudes towards children’s education between high and low-skilled parents, these attitudes
show a significant impact on children’s educational attainment (Patacchini and Zenou, 2009).
The aim of the present paper is to go further by looking at the interplay between family
and neighborhood eﬀects. To be more precise, we develop a theoretical framework in which
parents’ involvement in education as well as the neighborhood where children live are the
key ingredients in explaining educational outcomes.2 Indeed, based on some works on an-
thropology and sociology (see, in particular, Boyd and Richerson, 1985 and Cavalli-Sforza
and Feldman, 1981), there is a recent literature initiated by Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001)
arguing that the transmission of a particular trait (religion, ethnicity, social status, etc.) is
the outcome of a socialization inside and outside the family (like e.g. peers and role models).
These two types of socialization are cultural substitutes (complements) if parents have less
1See also the literature survey by Haveman and Wolfe (1995) who compare the sociological and economic
approaches.
2There are, in fact, theoretical papers that analyze either the eﬀects of parents’ input (see e.g. Becker and
Tomes, 1979, Leibowitz, 1974) or neighborhood quality (see e.g. De Bartolome, 1990, Benabou, 1993) on
children’s educational attainment. Our model links these two approaches and, as a result, gives a mechanism
through which both eﬀects aﬀect children’s outcomes.
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(more) incentive to socialize their children, the more widely dominant are their values in
the population. We use this idea to explain children’s educational attainment. Altruistic
parents, who can either be educated or not, have to decide how much time they spend in
educating their children. This is costly since parents have to give up leisure, but also reward-
ing since it positively influences the chances for their children of being educated. Contrary
to the cultural transmission literature cited above, where each parent wants his/her children
to be like him/her, here only educated parents conform to this behavior since uneducated
parents spend time with their children trying to help them become diﬀerent, i.e. educated.
Indeed, education is not, like for example religion or ethnicity, a trait that is horizontally
diﬀerentiated (so that it is a matter of taste which trait is considered better) but a trait, or
more exactly a characteristic, that it is vertically diﬀerentiated (so that everybody agrees
that more education is better than less). As in the cultural transmission model, children can
become educated either because parents have been successful in educating them (socializa-
tion inside the family) or, if this is not the case, because the neighborhood where they live is
of suﬃciently high-quality in terms of human capital (socialization outside the family). We
then model a possible interplay between these diﬀerent influences by assuming that the cost
of parental eﬀort in the children’s education depends on neighborhood quality. We give the
conditions on the cost function that yield cultural complementarity (higher neighborhood
quality leads to higher eﬀort) and substitutability (higher neighborhood quality leads to
lower eﬀort). Then, we show how these conditions aﬀect the probability of the child being
educated. We also distinguish between high- and low-educated parents by assuming that
the cost of eﬀort for their children’s education (e.g. doing homework with their children) is
lower for the former than for the latter.
We test our theoretical predictions by merging data on parents and children from the
UK National Child Development Study (NCDS) with data on neighborhood characteristics
from the 1971 UK Census (when children were 13 years old). Because of their longitudinal
aspect (members of the cohort are followed from age 7 to 33), the NCDS data are ideal for
our purpose. Our empirical strategy consists of providing an evaluation of the reduced-form
eﬀects of parental involvement and neighborhood quality on children’s educational qualifi-
cation. This approach relies on the available information on families living in council houses
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in big cities in the United Kingdom in the 1970s. We provide qualitative and quantitative
evidence revealing that the assignment of eligible families to council flats was indeed random
with respect to parental education. As a result, the location of families who live in council
houses in big cities in Britain can be considered as exogenous and the impact of neighborhood
eﬀects on educational outcomes can be identified.3
We find a significant and positive eﬀect of neighborhood quality on the parents’ eﬀort in
their children’s education, suggesting cultural complementarity.4 Both parental investment
and neighborhood quality contribute positively to children’s education attainment. However,
the eﬀect of parental investment seems to be more potent for children of high-educated
parents while neighborhood quality shows a more important role for children of low-educated
parents.
Our empirical evidence for the UK complements the results obtained for the US. As stated
above, the latter indicate a limited role for neighborhood factors in accounting for inequality
in educational attainment (Solon et al., 2000, Durlauf, 2004), which may be interpreted as
the fact that family is of greater importance than neighborhood. In the present paper, we go
further by diﬀerentiating between high- and low-educated families. Family seems to play the
most important role for children of high-educated parents while neighborhood displays the
most (direct) influential eﬀect on children’s educational attainment for low-skilled parents.
The interrelations between parental education and neighborhood eﬀects are, however,
complex and our analysis only provides one possible approach suggesting that both parental
eﬀort and neighborhood quality might play a role, which is diﬀerent depending on the ed-
ucational level of parents. Since peers usually live in the same neighborhood, our paper
also contributes to the literature on the influence of peers on own educational achievement.
3The use of information on families living in public houses was also adopted by Goux and Maurin (2007)
to identify neighborhood eﬀects on early performance at school in France and by Di Addario and Patacchini
(2008) to identify wage diﬀerentials between urban and non-urban areas in Italy. A similar institutional
argument has also been used by Oreopoulos (2003) and Jacob (2004).
4To the best of our knowledge, few papers have tested whether cultural substitution or cultural comple-
mentarity prevails. A rare exception is Bisin et al. (2004) for the transmission of religion who, in contrast
to this paper, find cultural substitution. This is quite intuitive since they are dealing with religion and thus,
the more isolated is a religion in an area, the higher is parents’ eﬀort in transmitting it. For education, we
find the contrary because education and the quality of the neighborhood are more complementary in nature.
4
However, it is extremely diﬃcult to disentangle neighborhood eﬀects from peer eﬀects and,
as noted by Goux and Maurin (2007), there is no consensus on the importance of peer eﬀects
on own achievement in this literature.5
Our model has highlighted one possible channel of interaction between family and neigh-
borhood inputs through the eﬀect of neighborhood quality on parental involvement in their
children’s education. Our empirical analysis reveals that this is an important channel and
shows that neighborhood quality also has a direct eﬀect (which may, for example, also act
through endogenous eﬀects, i.e. the educational attainment of peers), which is particularly
relevant for children from low-educated families. However, our reduced-form analysis does
not allow us to separate endogenous from exogenous (contextual) eﬀects. Nevertheless, it
provides evidence of a relevant eﬀect of the social context over and above the influence
of family background and school quality eﬀects. Socialization both inside and outside the
family is found to be important in the intergenerational transmission of education, with a
magnitude of the eﬀects that diﬀers between high- and low-educated families.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we survey the
literature on the impact of neighborhood eﬀects on the intergenerational transmission of
human capital. The basic theoretical model and its main predictions are exposed in section
3. Section 4 is devoted to the description of the data and the definition of the variables.
Section 5 deals with the empirical model and presents the estimation results. Finally, section
6 concludes the paper.
2 Neighborhood eﬀects and the intergenerational trans-
mission of human capital
There are diﬀerent papers that have studied the relationship between neighborhood and the
intergenerational transmission of human capital. Here, we review three important contribu-
5There is an extensive literature on peer eﬀects in educational performance. See the references in Goux
and Maurin (2007, p. 1195) and the two recent literature surveys by Ioannides (2010) and Ioannides and
Topa (2010).
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tions to this literature. First, Kremer (1997) proposes the following equation:
hi,t+1 = a0 +
α
2
(hfi,t + hmi,t) + βhν(i),t + εi, (1)
where hi,t+1 denotes the human capital of a member of the ith dynasty in generation t + 1
(i.e. the child), hfi,t and hmi,t are the human capital levels of members of the same dynasty
in generation t (i.e. the parents) with fi designing the father and mi the mother, and hν(i)t
is the human capital level of the neighborhood ν(i) where the individual lives at time t. If ni
denotes the size of this neighborhood, then hν(i)t = 1ni
P
j∈ν(i) hjt. As usual, εi is a stochastic
shock. Estimating equation (1) using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Kremer
(1997) found that the estimate of β, the neighborhood eﬀect, is large when it is compared
to the eﬀect of parents’ education (α).
Borjas (1992) explores equation (1) in more detail by focussing on ethnic groups. In his
model, parents value their own consumption as well as the human capital of their oﬀsprings.
However, the crucial equation is the one that relates the human capital obtained by a child
belonging to ethnic group g, hig,t+1, to that of his/her parents, hpig,t (with pig denoting the
parent of child i belonging to ethnic group g), and the average human capital of his/her
ethnic group, hg,t = 1ng
P
j∈g hpj ,t, where ng is the size of the ethnic group. Formally,
hig,t+1 = γ1hpig,t + γ2hg,t + ξig,t. (2)
Naturally, the variables “neighborhood” and “ethnicity” are highly correlated since minori-
ties tend to live together. The main findings of Borjas (1992) are to show that using the
General Social Surveys and the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth, ethnic capital (as
measured by hg,t, the average human capital level of the ethnic group in the parents’ gener-
ation) plays a crucial role in intergenerational mobility, and slows down the convergence in
the average skills of ethnic groups across generations.
Finally, Ioannides (2002, 2003) deepens the analysis of intergenerational transmission
of human capital by explicitly developing a dynamic model of human capital formation
with a neighborhood selection. He estimates this model using the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID). Thus, Ioannides generalizes the two previous papers (Kremer and Borjas)
by focussing on nonlinear dynamic models. Following Borjas (1992), he assumes that parents
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value their consumption and the human capital of their children. The key human capital
transmission equation to be estimated is nonlinear and given by:
lnhi,t+1 = a0 + ap ln
h
Dh1−1/φfi,t + (1−D)h
1−1/φ
mi,t
i
+ ln
⎛
⎝X
j∈ν(i)
μν(i)jh
1−1/ψ
j,t
⎞
⎠
ψ
ψ−1
, (3)
where μν(i)j denotes the frequency of the value of hjt within the distribution of educational
attainment of the population in neighborhood ν(i) at time t, and μ(.) is the entire distri-
bution. The idea here is to study the impact of parental education and the distribution
of educational attainment within a relevant neighborhood on child educational attainment.
From a theoretical viewpoint, Ioannides obtains a complete characterization of the prop-
erties of the intertemporal evolution of human capital. From an empirical viewpoint, he
finds that there are strong neighboring eﬀects in the transmission of human capital and that
parents’ education and neighbors’ education have nonlinear eﬀects that are consistent with
the theory.
As we will see below, our model is diﬀerent since we focus on the interaction between
cultural transmission and neighboring eﬀects and their impact on the intergenerational trans-
mission of human capital. To be more precise, the key distinguishing features of our model
are twofold: (i) the suggestion of both direct and indirect mechanisms through which neigh-
borhoods might aﬀect human capital accumulation; and (ii) the diﬀerences across households
at diﬀerent levels of education.
3 Theoretical model
In this section, we analyze the intergenerational transmission of education. The key ques-
tion we would like to answer is how much parents are influenced by the local environment
when deciding on their educational eﬀort level. As in Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001), the
transmission of education is modeled as a mechanism interacting socialization inside the
family (vertical socialization) with socialization outside the family (oblique socialization) via
imitation and learning from individuals living in the same neighborhood.
There are two types of parents/workers: high-educated, i = h, and low-educated parents
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(workers), i = l.6 There is a continuum of each of them. The expected utility of a parent of
type i = h, l is given by:
EV i = zi|{z}
Utility from consumption
+ U(λi, ei)− δiΨ(ei, q)| {z }
Utility from putting eﬀort in educating children
+ W
¡
a, ei, q, wh, wl
¢| {z }
Utility from children’s educational achievement
where zi is the quantity of a consumption good (taken as the numeraire) consumed by
parents, λi is the time spent on leisure, ei is the time (eﬀort) they spend with their children
trying to educate them, q is the proportion of high-educated individuals in the neighborhood,
δh = 1 and δl = δ, with δ > 1, 0 < a < 1 is the degree of altruism that is common for both
educated and uneducated parents, and wi is the per-hour wage (with wh > wl). U(.) is
assumed to be increasing in λi and decreasing in eﬀort ei and concave in both arguments.
This utility function EV i has three terms. The first one, zi, is the utility of consuming the
composite good. The second term, U(λi, ei) − δiΨ(ei, q), is the utility that parents derived
from putting eﬀort in educating their child. U(λi, ei) captures the fact that the time spent
with children and the time spent on leisure are not independent activities for parents. For
that, we assume that the cross-derivative of λi and ei is positive, i.e.
∂2U(λi, ei)
∂λi∂ei
≥ 0
The utility cost of eﬀort, δiΨ(ei, q), is increasing and convex in ei, and decreasing in q.
The latter is due to the fact that the higher is the proportion of high-educated families in
the neighborhood, the lower is the cost of putting in eﬀort because of peer eﬀects (positive
externalities, peer pressure, etc.). For example, if a low-educated parent wants to help
his/her child do his/her homework in mathematics, it will be easier if his/her neighbors
are highly educated because they can either help him/her or pressure him/her to do so.
Furthermore, for a given q, this cost δiΨ(ei, q) is assumed to be higher for low-educated than
6We could generalize the model in order to have a continuous education variable. For example, we could
assume that education is a continuous variable whose c.d.f. is defined on the interval [h, h]. This would not
change the analysis to any greater extent since, in order to define q, we would still need to have two types
of education. For this purpose, we would need to define a cutoﬀ point, eh ∈ [h, h], so that all individuals
belonging to [h,eh] would be uneducated and all individuals belonging to [eh, h] would be educated. This
would not change the main result of our model, just complicate the analysis.
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for high-educated parents. Indeed, it is quite natural to assume that it is less costly for a
high-educated parent to put eﬀort into education than for a low-educated parent because of
knowledge due to the initial education. For example, it is certainly less costly for an engineer
to teach mathematics to his/her child than for a parent from the working class who did not
get any education. The same will apply for a parent who, for example, is an English teacher
and who wants to help his/her child with English as compared to a non-educated parent.
To capture this eﬀect, we assume the total cost of providing eﬀort to be equal to: δiΨ(ei, q),
where δh = 1 and δl = δ, with δ > 1. In other words, δ ≡ δl/δh expresses the relative cost of
spending eﬀort for low-educated parents. Observe that the multiplicative nature of the term
δiΨ(ei, q) implies that parental education has a Hicks-neutral eﬀect on the cost of teaching
one’s own children, which means that the trade-oﬀ between ei and q in the cost function is
not impacted by the education of the parent.
The last term, W
¡
a, ei, q, wh, wl
¢
, is the utility that parents derived from their child’s
educational achievement. It a function of a, their degree of altruism, ei, the eﬀort their put
in educating their child, q, the percentage of educated people in the neighborhood, and wi,
the wage that their child will obtain when adult.7
The budget constraint of a parent i = h, l can be written as follows:
wiT = zi, (4)
where T denotes the amount of working hours. T is assumed to be the same and constant
across workers, an assumption that agrees with most jobs in the vast majority of developed
countries.8 In (4), all income is assumed to be spent on own consumption and none on the
child’s education. This is just for simplicity since adding educated-related expenses in (4)
will not change any of our results. It will just add to the notation.
7In fact, if time was introduced in this model, we should have written:
hi,t+1 =W
¡
a, ei,t, q, wh,t+1, wl,t+1
¢
since parent i puts eﬀort today at time t (so that we have ei,t) but the achievement of their child occurs at
time t + 1 (so that we have wh,t+1 and wl,t+1, and thus hi,t+1). Because we basically use a static model
(there is no discount rate), we assume that all events appear simultaneously.
8We could have assumed that more highly educated parents work more hours than less educated parents.
This would not aﬀect any of our results.
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Each parent provides a fixed amount of labor time T and spends some time on leisure
and with his/her children. Thus, the time constraint of a parent i = h, l can be written as:
1− T = λi + ei, (5)
where the total amount of time is normalized to 1 without loss of generality.
By plugging (4) and (5) into the utility function, we obtain the following expected utility
for parents of type i = h, l:
EV i = wiT + U
¡
1− T − ei, ei
¢
− δiΨ(ei, q) +W
¡
a, ei, q, wh, wl
¢
. (6)
Since both leisure λi and parental educational eﬀort ei determine utility U(.), the assumption
that U(.) is increasing in λi and decreasing in ei means, in particular, that educational eﬀort
has a disutility besides reducing leisure. This is a plausible albeit not necessary assumption.
A typical costly educational eﬀort is the parent’s fatigue and the possible conflict between
the child and the parent when doing homework together.
Let us now explain how education transmission works. We denote by πij the probability
that a child of type−i parent (i ∈ {h, l}) obtains education j ∈ {h, l}. Since there is a
continuum of agents, by the Law of Large Numbers, πij also denotes the fraction of children
having a type−i parent and reaching an education level j. As in Bisin and Verdier (2000,
2001), we assume that for both the educated and the non-educated parent, education will be
successful with a probability equal to the education eﬀort ei.9 This is the vertical transmission
of education (i.e. from the parent to the child). If transmission is thus not successful, then the
horizontal transmission (i.e. from people of the neighborhood to the child) will play a major
role and, in that case, the child will adopt the average education of his/her neighborhood.
Therefore, it is at this second stage, after the parents’ unsuccessful transmission of education,
that children are influenced by the people living in his/her neighborhood. We obtain the
following transition probabilities:
πhh = eh + (1− eh)q (7)
9We could have assumed a more general function so that education would be successful with a probability
which a function of education eﬀort ei. We would have to impose some conditions on this function but no
analytical solution would be obtained in that case.
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πhl = (1− eh)(1− q) (8)
πll = (1− el)(1− q) (9)
πlh = el + (1− el)q. (10)
Let us interpret equation (7). The child of a highly educated parent will also be highly
educated if either his/her parents’ education transmission is successful (probability eh) or
the parent fails to transmit his/her trait (probability 1 − eh) and the child picks up the
education trait from his/neighborhood (probability q). Equation (8) gives the probability
that a child of educated parents is not educated: it is because both the parents and the
neighborhood were unsuccessful in educating the child. For low-educated parents (equations
(9) and (10)), we have a similar interpretation.
We are now able to write explicitly W
¡
a, ei, q, wh, wl
¢
, the utility that parents derived
from their child’s educational achievement. We assume that all parents (educated or not)
are altruist and thus do care about the future job situation of their children. We denote by
V ij, i = h, l, j = h, l, the future utility of a child j whose parent is of type i. Note that
this utility is evaluated by the parents and thus takes their point of view (this is referred
to as imperfect empathy by Bisin and Verdier, 2000, 2001). The simplest interpretation of
these utilities is in terms of the child’s future income, given that wh > wl. In other words,
all parents (educated or not) will be better oﬀ if their children achieve high education and
thus make more money. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we have:
V hh = V lh = wh
V hl = V ll = wl.
As a result, using (7)−(10), the (expected) utility that educated parents derived from their
child’s educational achievement is equal to:
W
¡
a, eh, q, wh, wl
¢
= πhhV hh + πhlV hl
= a eh (1− q)
¡
wh − wl
¢
+ a
£
qwh + (1− q)wl
¤
while that of low-educated parents is:
W
¡
a, el, q, wh, wl
¢
= πllV ll + πlhV lh
= a el (1− q)
¡
wh − wl
¢
+ a
£
qwh + (1− q)wl
¤
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Let us now focus on the parents’ choice of eﬀort ei ∈ [0, 1 − T ]. The expected utility of
educated and non-educated parents is, respectively, given by:10
EV h = whT + U
¡
1− T − eh, eh
¢
+ a eh (1− q)
¡
wh − wl
¢
+ a
£
qwh + (1− q)wl
¤
−Ψ(eh, q)
EV l = wlT + U
¡
1− T − el, el
¢
+ a el (1− q)
¡
wh − wl
¢
+ a
£
qwh + (1− q)wl
¤
− δΨ(el, q).
Let us now determine ei, the eﬀort choice of parents i = h, l. If we use the following notations
Uλi ≡ ∂U∂λi , Uei ≡
∂U
∂ei , Ψei ≡
∂Ψ(ei,q)
∂ei , the first-order conditions for educated and uneducated
parents are given by (we only focus on interior solutions):11
−Uλi + Uei + a (1− q)
¡
wh − wl
¢
− δiΨei = 0, (11)
where δh = 1 and δl = δ, with δ > 1. The solution of (11) is denoted by ei∗, which is equal
to eh∗(q) and el∗(q, δ) for high- and low-educated parents, respectively. Let us denote by:
Uλiλi ≡ ∂
2U
∂λi∂λi , Ueiei ≡
∂2U
∂ei∂ei , Uλiei ≡
∂2U
∂λi∂ei , Ψeiei ≡
∂2Ψi(ei,q)
∂ei∂ei , and Ψeiq ≡
∂2Ψi(ei,q)
∂ei∂q . By totally
diﬀerentiating (11), we obtain:
∂ei∗
∂q
=
a
¡
wh − wl
¢
+ δiΨeiq
Uλiλi − 2Uλiei + Ueiei − δiΨeiei
. (12)
We have the following proposition:
10The altruistic model was made famous by Becker (1974, 1991). For a literature survey on these types of
models, see Laferrere and Wolﬀ (2004).
11For each parent i = h, l, the second-order condition is given by:
Uλiλi + Ueiei − 2Uλiei − δiΨeiei .
Since we have assumed that Uλiλi < 0, Ueiei < 0, Uλiei ≥ 0, and Ψeiei > 0, the second-order condition is
always satisfied.
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Proposition 1
(i) High-educated parents spend more time (i.e. exert more eﬀort) educating their oﬀspring
than low-educated parents, and this diﬀerence increases by δ, the relative cost diﬀerence
in providing eﬀort.
(ii) If Ψeiq > 0, then for both educated and uneducated parents, the higher is the proportion
of high-educated families in the area, the lower is the eﬀort parents put into educating
their children, that is:
∂ei∗
∂q
< 0, for i = h, l.
This is referred to as cultural substitution.
(iii) Assume that Ψeiq < 0 and −Ψeiq > a
¡
wh − wl
¢
/δi. Then, for both educated and
uneducated parents, the higher is the proportion of high-educated people in the area, the
higher is the eﬀort parents put into educating their children, that is:
∂ei∗
∂q
> 0, for i = h, l.
This is referred to as cultural complementarity.
The first-order condition (11) shows that the choice of e∗ involves a trade oﬀ between the
short-run costs of spending time with children (both in terms of forgone leisure and direct
cost Ψi(ei)) and its long-run expected benefits, which consist of a better chance of having an
educated child. The sign of ∂e
i∗
∂q clearly depends on
∂2EV i
∂ei∂q . Indeed, if this cross-derivative is
negative (positive), meaning that the higher is q, the lower (higher) is the marginal expected
utility of eﬀort, then cultural substitution (complementarity) prevails. More precisely, when
Ψeiq > 0, i.e. the higher is eﬀort e, the higher is the marginal cost of eﬀort, then the
short-run costs are higher, and therefore the parents put in less eﬀort, the higher is the level
of education in the neighborhood (cultural substitution). In contrast, when Ψeiq < 0 and
−Ψeiq > a
¡
wh − wl
¢
/δi, parents put in more eﬀort, the higher is the level of education in
the neighborhood (cultural complementarity).
We can now calculate the expected school achievement of each individual by focusing on
the diﬀerent transition probabilities.
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Proposition 2
(i) For educated parents whose eﬀort is eh∗(q) and given by (11), the probability that their
child will be educated is:
πhh = q + eh∗(q) (1− q) ,
while the probability that their child will not be educated is:
πhl =
£
1− eh∗(q)
¤
(1− q).
(ii) For low-educated parents whose eﬀort is el∗(q) and given by (11), the probabilities that
their child will be educated and non-educated are respectively given by:
πll =
£
1− el∗(q, δ)
¤
(1− q)
πlh = q + el∗(q, δ) (1− q) .
(iii) For both parents (educated or not), if there is cultural complementarity, a better-quality
neighborhood increases the probability of being educated and decreases the probability of
being uneducated, that is ∂π
hh
∂q > 0,
∂πlh
∂q > 0 and
∂πhl
∂q < 0,
∂πll
∂q < 0. If there is cultural
substitution, all these eﬀects are undetermined. Finally, for a given neighborhood qual-
ity q, parents’ eﬀort always increases the chance for their oﬀspring of being educated,
that is ∂π
hh
∂eh > 0,
∂πlh
∂el > 0 and
∂πhl
∂eh < 0,
∂πll
∂el < 0.
Results (i) and (ii) just express the transition probabilities (7)-(10) in terms of optimal
parents’ eﬀort. The interesting result is (iii) since it shows the impact of both the quality
of the neighborhood and parents’ involvement in children’s educational attainment. Since
the education process is in two stages (first the parents’ involvement ei and then the neigh-
borhood’s quality q) and since both stages are influenced by q, there are two eﬀects: an
indirect one, where ei hinges on q, and a direct one, because if ei fails, then only q aﬀects
children’s educational attainment. So, when there is cultural complementarity, these two
eﬀects reinforce each other since a higher q implies larger indirect (the higher the quality
of the neighborhood, the higher the parents’ eﬀort) and direct eﬀects. If, in contrast, there
is cultural substitution, then a better quality neighborhood reduces the chances of being
14
educated by parents (since parents spend less time with their kids) but increases the chances
of being educated by “peers” (since q is higher, the chances of meeting a high-educated peer
are higher). The net eﬀect is thus ambiguous.
Finally, we have the following result, which is a consequence of the two above propositions:
Proposition 3 For low-educated parents,
(i) the higher is the cost of education δ, the lower is the educational eﬀort el∗, i.e. ∂e
l∗
∂δ < 0;
(ii) the higher is the cost of education δ, the higher is the probability of the child being
uneducated and the lower is the probability of being educated, i.e. ∂π
ll
∂δ > 0 and
∂πlh
∂δ < 0;
(iii) When δ is suﬃciently high, the eﬀort el∗ provided by uneducated parents is negligible
and thus, the quality of the neighborhood q has no impact on el∗. In that case, the
probability of being educated or not only depends on the quality of the neighborhood,
that is πll = 1− q and πlh = q.
This last proposition focuses on low-educated parents. If educational eﬀort is too costly,
then obviously only the environment where children live (i.e. peers and role models) will
aﬀect children’s educational attainment.
To summarize, the key feature of this model is that both socialization inside the family
(the role of parents) and socialization outside the family (the role of peers living in the same
neighborhood) play an important role in the educational process of children. This means that
there are diﬀerential eﬀects on the child’s education because of parental education and the
interactions of neighborhood quality and parental investment. Depending on the assumptions
on the cost function, there is either cultural substitution (i.e. better neighborhood quality
leads to more parental investment) or cultural complementarity (i.e. better neighborhood
quality leads to less parental investment). If we focus on the extreme cases, then if children
live in a “good” environment with educated parents who take care of them, the chances of
obtaining a high education level is very high. If, in contrast, they live in a rundown area
with low-quality schools and negative peer pressures and if, on top of that, their parents are
not educated and do not spend time with them, then the probability of being educated is
quite low for these children.
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4 Data and descriptive evidence
4.1 Data
Our empirical analysis is based on data from the National Child Development Study (NCDS).
It is a longitudinal survey that follows all British individuals who were born between the 3rd
and 9th of March 1958, with follow-up surveys in 1965 at the age of 7 (NCDS sweep one), in
1969 at the age of 11 (NCDS sweep two), in 1974 at the age of 16 (NCDS sweep three), in 1981
at the age of 23 (NCDS sweep four), and in 1991 at the age of 33 (NCDS sweep five). This
dataset is ideal for the purpose of this paper as it contains detailed parental and child infor-
mation, as well as data on family background, school quality and area of residence identifiers
for cohort members’ residential addresses. Good family background information is essential
when trying to find evidence of neighborhood eﬀects since neighborhood characteristics may
proxy for unobservable family characteristics. The information on the residential location
allows us to match NCDS data with the 1971 Census data, thus obtaining a detailed picture
of the residential neighborhood community when cohort members were teenagers (age 13).
Census information is taken from the Small Area Statistics (SAS) datasets. In particular,
data on education, economic activity and occupation of each residential community area are
only available for the 10% sample survey. This implies extremely small sample sizes per area
if the most basic census spatial unit, i.e. enumeration district (with an average of 300-400
residents), is used as a neighborhood measure. Therefore, we are forced to choose the next
available level of spatial disaggregation: we use ward level data, providing 17,500 areas in
the UK in 1971 with an average of 3,000-4,000 residents. A Census ward roughly contains
ten enumeration districts and thus, it is quite small: it is equivalent to a Census tract in the
US (which on average contains 4,000 inhabitants).
Our empirical analysis matches information on individuals’ educational attainment at
the age of 33 from the NCDS fifth sweep with the information on parental characteristics,
quality of the school attended at age 16, ability in the childhood from earlier NCDS sweeps
and residential neighborhood information from the 1971 Census (when the individuals are
13 years old).
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4.2 Definition of variables
The key variables in the theoretical model are parents’ eﬀort in their children’s education
(ei), transition probabilities (πij) and neighborhood human capital (q).
Let us first discuss our empirical proxy for parental interest in the child’s education.
The ideal variable for measuring parents’ eﬀort would have been the number of hours spent
investing in children’s education (reading to the child, meeting teachers, etc...). Unfortu-
nately, this variable is not directly available in the NCDS. However, the NCDS provides rich
qualitative information on parental interest in the child’s education at diﬀerent ages of the
child. In particular, in the NCDS sweep one (parental questionnaire), it is asked: “Does
the mother/father read to, or read with, the child?”, and the possible answers suggested are
“Yes, at least every week; Yes occasionally; Never or hardly ever” and it is stated to put a
circle around/encircle the appropriate definition (only one for each parent).12 We rank the
parents according to the highest frequency declared by each couple and code the responses
using a dichotomous variable. Such a variable (labeled as “parents read to child”) takes the
value of one if the parents read to the child at least once every week and zero otherwise
(i.e., if they read to the child only occasionally or never or hardly ever).13 Observe that we
obtain this information from the NCDS sweep one (age 7 in 1965), i.e. when the child has
just started school and has not yet been “educated”. This choice should ensure that this
indicator of parental interest in a child’s education is not driven by the child’s schooling per-
formance. Indeed, the parents’ frequency of reading to their child at that early stage should
closely proxy parental care (in the sense used in the model, namely the amount of time spent
caring for a child’s education) independently of the child’s future schooling achievements.
Let us now turn to the empirical counterparts of the other key variables of the theoretical
model, that is πij and q. The NCDS sweep five (the child is now a 33 year old adult in 1991)
provides information on the highest qualification obtained by the cohort members. We define
12Non-response is not an issue here. Missing values are reported in less than 5% of the observations. A
residual category “Don’t know or inapplicable” occurs in less than 2% of the responses. We group these
responses with the “low involvement” category.
13A diﬀerent coding of this variable allowing more than two levels that leads to the estimation of ordered
probit models does not qualitatively change our results.
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high-educated individuals as those with A-levels14 or higher qualifications and the remaining
ones as low-educated individuals. As a proxy for average neighborhood education quality
in an area k at time t, i.e. qk,t, we use the percentage of individuals aged above 18 years
holding a A-level or higher in a ward k from the Census 1971 data, i.e. when the child is 13
years old.
Finally, the parents’ education is measured using completed years of schooling. This
information is derived from the age at which the parents left school, which is reported in
1974 (NCDS sweep three). We define parents of type i = h if the mother and the father’s
average years of schooling exceed 12 years and parents of type i = l otherwise. So, for
example, πhhn,t+1 is the probability that an adult n who is aged 33 in t + 1 = 1991 has at
least an A-level degree given that his/her parents have (on average) more than 12 completed
years of schooling.
To summarize, we evaluate parents’ eﬀort when the child is 7 (in 1965), the quality of the
neighborhood and parents’ level of education when the child is 13 (in 1971) and the child’s
educational attainment when he/she is 33 years old (in 1991).
5 Identification strategy and estimation results
5.1 Institutional background: the allocation policy of social hous-
ing in the UK
The legislation governing the allocation of social housing in the UK has changed over time.
In 2002 (Homelessness Act 2002), the procedure for allocating council houses to tenants was
revised and Choice-Based Letting (CBL) schemes were introduced. CBL schemes now allow
applicants for social housing to apply for available vacancies that are widely advertised.
Applicants can see the full range of available properties and can bid for any home to which
they are matched. The successful bidder is the one with the highest priority under the
14The A-level (or the Advanced Level General Certificate of Education) is a qualification oﬀered by most
educational institutions in the UK that is widely recognised around the world. It is the standard entry
qualification for assessing the suitability of applicants for academic courses in UK universities. Most students
study for this qualification from the age of 16 to 18.
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scheme. As a result, social tenants in the UK are now given a greater choice in housing.
However, in the 1970s, the period in which our analysis is performed, the allocation of
tenants to council houses was completely under the management of council oﬃcers seeking to
match applicants to available vacancies giving a “reasonable preference” to certain categories
of people in identified housing needs (Hills, 2007). The requirement to give “reasonable
preference” to certain applicants dates back at least to the 1936 Housing Act, but even in
the 1957 Housing Act, there was little guidance on how to do so and there were no precisely
defined need-based criteria (Greenhalgh and Moss, 2009). At the same time, part of the
philosophy of post-war social housing was to avoid the kind of polarization between areas
that market forces might create. As expressed by Aneurin Bevan, UK Minister of Health, in
1949: “We should aim to introduce what has always been the lovely feature of the English
and Welsh village, where the doctor, the grocer, the butcher and the farm labourer all lived
in the same street ... the living tapestry of a mixed community.” As a result, during the
1960s, social housing did accommodate a population with a mix of incomes (Hills, 2007).15
The allocation procedure was essentially by date-order, with the flexibility to advance cases
on the waiting list on basis of some social (or medical) reasons. An important “social reason”
was “local connection” (or “contribution to the community”): applicants had to live or work
in the council area to obtain a new flat to rent (Greenhalgh and Moss, 2009). In practice,
this ruled out any scope for “gaming” the local council and moving to a Local Authority
with a shorter waiting list (or better neighborhoods).
Roughly speaking, the allocation of council tenants to council houses was functioning as
follows. Interested people applied to the Local Authority (LA) where they habitually resided.
The LA put them on a waiting list and considered their family characteristics (mainly how
many children, their age, labor force status, special needs) to decide which type of flat to
allocate them to (i.e. how large). Applicants could express a preference for where to be
located but demand outstripped supply, and little consideration was given to preferences.
In particular, for areas such as London and other big cities, the number of applicants was
far greater than the available space and no consideration at all was given to preferences:
15The fact that there is a social mix in the council housing population in the UK in the 1970s gives our
results some considerable external validity.
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the length of time on the waiting list was the most important screening criterion. When an
applicant had worked his/her way up to the head of the queue by patience, he/she received
the first available oﬀer which was “that or nothing” (Regan and Patrick, 2001). Refusal
to accept an oﬀer of accommodation was associated with a severe penalty (for example,
suspension from the waiting list for a long period of time) and never happened in practice.
Therefore, the neighborhood location of an allocated council home at the beginning of the
1970s was largely unrelated to the resources and preferences of the tenant, especially in big
cities. In addition, rents in the social sector were considerably lower than in the private
sector and the turnover was also very low. One of the reasons at the basis of the revision
of the system, which started in the 1980s, was exactly the fact that the waiting lists were
becoming excessively long.16 Our discussion so far seems to point towards the fact that the
information contained in our data set oﬀers a setting where the influence of the social context
can be evaluated. In the following section, we will provide some evidence in support of our
identification strategy using our data.
5.2 Identification strategy
We focus on the families who live in council provided accommodations in 1974 (NCDS sweep
three) in big cities. In our data, the “cities” are all those Census districts listed as ‘C.B.’
(major cities and towns in England and Wales), ‘L.B.’ (London Boroughs), and ‘Cities’ in
Scotland. Around 40% of the NCDS sample of families were resident in such districts in
1974 and living in council houses.
Our identifying assumption is that the allocation of council tenants to neighborhoods
is unrelated to the tenants’ own education or concern for their child’s education. A test
of the validity of this assumption is to regress parents’ education on neighborhood educa-
tional status (with local authority dummies). We then investigate the relationship between
16At the same time, the local authority housing stock has declined, mainly due to Right to Buy (RTB)
programs introduced in the 1980s for registered social tenants, which were not accompanied by correspond-
ing new public investments in building new houses. The new inflow of tenants thus became increasingly
determined by strict need-based criteria, which each council was obliged to publish after the 1996 Housing
Act.
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the parents’ (mean) years of education and the ward-proportion of adults with A-levels and
above for families living in houses in the private sector and the social sector (council tenants).
Table 1 reports the OLS estimation results. The first column contains the results for families
in private accommodations and reveals a highly significant correlation between the two vari-
ables, with an elasticity at about 0.035. The second column shows the results of the same
regression but only for families living in council-provided accommodation. Interestingly, it
shows that there is no correlation between the level of education of the parents and the
average human capital of the neighborhood. The last two columns report the results which
are obtained when using quality of schools (“school composition” as defined in Table A1)
rather than the percentage of high-skilled population as a measure of neighborhood quality.
The evidence remains qualitatively unchanged.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Table 2 displays the characteristics of the residential neighborhood, distinguishing be-
tween high-educated and low-educated parents. We find that the means are not statistically
diﬀerent between the two groups. Therefore, the assignment of council tenants across neigh-
borhoods in big cities appears to be random with respect to parental education. The validity
of such an assumption thus allows us to provide an evaluation of the reduced-form equation
of our model.
[Insert Table 2 here]
5.3 Estimation results
Let us now test propositions 1, 2, that is the influence of the local environment (quality of
the peers) on the parents’ decision of spending time with their children and the impact of
both parents’ investment and local environment quality on the ultimate education attain-
ment of the children. Our final sample consists of 2,598 children (and 4,960 parents) from
families living in council houses in UK cities in the 1970s. Table A1 in the Appendix (and
Table 2 above) contains the description of the variables available for this sample and the
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corresponding summary statistics, for high-educated and low-educated parents separately.
The table does not show any marked diﬀerences between the two groups.
Let us begin by considering Proposition 1.
We model the underlying parents’ propensity in investing in their children’s education
(ei) as a linear function of parental, child, household and neighborhood characteristics. A
probit specification is employed where the dependent variable is equal to one if the parents
spend substantial time on their child’s education and zero otherwise. From Proposition 1,
the following model is considered:
ein,k,t = αqk,t +
MX
m=1
βmxm,t + εn,t n = 1, ..., N, (13)
where ein,k,t is the time spent by the parents of child n of type i = h, l who resides in area
k = 1, ..., K at time t on educating the child; qk,t is the average quality in terms of education
of area k at time t; xm,t (form = 1, ...,M) is a set ofM control variables at the parental, child,
household and area level at time t, accounting for diﬀerences in socio-economic characteristics
between parents, children, families and areas (listed in Tables 2 and A1); εn,t is a white noise
error term. A test of this equation will allow us to evaluate the prediction of the theoretical
model. First, for high-educated parents (i = h), an α significantly diﬀerent from zero will
indicate either cultural substitution (if negative) or cultural complementarity (if positive).
Moreover, even if this coeﬃcient is not statistically significant, it will provide information
on the form of the trade-oﬀ between neighborhood composition and parental investment in
education.
Table 3 reports the marginal eﬀects (at the sample means) and standard errors (in paren-
theses) of our measure of neighborhood quality (i.e. percentage of high-skilled population)
based on an OLS estimation of model (13), when using an increasing set of controls.17
[Insert Table 3 here]
The estimated neighborhood quality influence decreases by more than one third (for
both types of parents) when including family background variables (specification 2), but it
17Because the use of cross-equation restrictions is always rejected by our data, model (13) is estimated
separately for children of high-educated and low-educated parents.
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remains statistically significant and sizeable even when purging our estimates from the role
of the school chosen by the parents (specifications 3 and 4). When the most extensive set
of our controls is included (specification 4), for both types of parents, we find a positive
and statistically significant eﬀect of neighborhood quality on parental eﬀort in the child’s
education. This suggests cultural complementarity in parents’ behavior since the better the
quality of the neighborhood, the more they invest in their child’s education. Regarding
the magnitude of the eﬀect, for high-educated parents, a marginal increase (a 1 percent
increase) in the average level of education of the neighborhood increases the probability
that the parents devote more eﬀort to their children’s education by roughly 0.05. For low-
educated parents, the estimated eﬀect is still positive and significant but largely reduced in
magnitude (about 0.02). In conformity with Propositions 1 and 3, this may be due to the
fact that δ, the cost of exerting eﬀort for low-educated parents, is relatively high. A t−test
on the contrast between the estimated coeﬃcients for high and low-educated parents always
rejects the null hypothesis of equal eﬀects (the t statistics range between 4.08 and 4.65 in
the various specifications). This provides a formal test of diﬀerences in neighborhood eﬀects
on parents with diﬀerent levels of education.
Focusing our attention on the test of Proposition 2, we model the likelihood of a success-
ful or unsuccessful intergenerational transmission of education (transition probabilities) as
follows:
πijn,t+1 = φqk,t + γe
i
n,k,t + ρ(qk,t.e
i
n,k,t) +
MX
m=1
θmxm,t + ηn,t+1 n = 1, ..., N, (14)
where πijn,t+1 is the probability that an adult n at time t+ 1 (who was a child n at t) whose
parents are of type i = h, l attains the level of education j = h, l; qk,t is the quality of the
neighborhood k when the adult was a child at time t; ein,k,t is parental involvement when
the adult was a child at time t; and ηn,t+1 is a white noise error term. The control variables
included in the set xm,t (for m = 1, ...,M) are allowed to have a diﬀerent impact on π
ij
n,t+1
than they had on ein,k,t. This is of particular interest for our target variable qk,t, which has
been separated from the set of control variables for ease of clarity.
The probabilities πijt+1 are analyzed using probit models, each of them having the depen-
dent variable equal to one if the (observed) implied child’s educational attainment is achieved
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and zero otherwise. A successful test of Proposition 2 would imply that for children of high-
educated parents, the eﬀect of both qk,t and e ik,t must be significant, whereas for children of
low-educated parents, both eﬀects are expected to be significant only if δ is suﬃciently low,
otherwise only the impact of qk,t should be of importance. Indeed, as δ increases, not only
should the eﬀort for low-educated parents decline but, by comparing (7) and (10), the eﬀect
of similar neighborhood composition q should be higher for low-educated households.
Finally, if there is cultural complementarity, one would expect both the impacts of qk,t
and e in,k,t to be positive for π
hh and πlh (and negative for πhl and πll) while, with cultural
substitution, their signs would be undetermined.
The estimation results of equation (14) show that the impact of the interaction term (the
estimate of ρ in model (14)) is never significant in any model specification (i.e., with diﬀerent
sets of controls)18 and the eﬀects of the other variables are almost unchanged (only slightly
higher in absolute value) after its exclusion. This indicates that the impact of parental
interest on children’s education attainment does not vary with the average human capital of
the neighborhood.19 Thus, we focus on the results in Table 4, which exclude the interaction
term from the regressors.20
Tables 4 reports the marginal eﬀects (at the sample means) and standard errors (in
parentheses) of parental eﬀort in the child’s education and residential community human
18The results with the interaction term are not reported here for brevity but are available upon request.
19The fact that ρ is not significant has no implication on cultural substituability or cultural complemen-
tarity. Indeed, cultural substitution is defined as (see Proposition 1):
∂ei∗
∂q
< 0, for i = h, l.
and cultural substitution is:
∂ei∗
∂q
> 0, for i = h, l.
while
ρ =
∂πij∗
∂ei∗∂q
20We have also estimated a version of the model including interactions between our school-level vari-
ables and both parental eﬀort and neighborhood quality. We find non-statistically significant eﬀects for all
interaction terms included in the model. This evidence suggests that the impact of parental inputs and
neighborhood quality do not vary significantly with school quality.
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capital when using an increasing set of controls.21 ,22 The dependent variables are the transi-
tion probability πij described in Proposition 2. Clearly, conditionally on parental education,
the probabilities that a child achieves an A-level degree (or above) and that she/he does not,
sum to one. Thus, we only report the results for πhh and πlh (πhl = 1−πhh and πll = 1−πlh),
focussing the analysis on the successful transmission of education.
[Insert Table 4 here]
We start with a specification (specification 1), which only includes the quality of the
neighborhood, our selection of neighborhood characteristics and local authority dummies. It
appears that the neighborhood education level is an important factor for a successful trans-
mission of education and its importance appears to be diﬀerent between high-educated and
low-educated parents. Moving to specification 2, we include our other variable of theoret-
ical interest, i.e. “parents read to child”. Such an inclusion largely reduces the estimated
coeﬃcient on the neighborhood quality variable, in particular for high-educated parents.
This evidence indicates that a sizeable portion of the eﬀect of the neighborhood quality acts
through parental eﬀort and therefore supports our theoretical mechanism. We then look
at the impacts of neighborhood quality and parental eﬀort, conditional on the characteris-
tics of the children’s parents and family (specification 3). They are only slightly reduced
in magnitude and remains statistically significant even when we control for the child’s abil-
ity (specification 4). Finally, we investigate whether neighborhood quality eﬀects operate
purely through the quality of local schooling. Thus, we first use the proportion of boys or
girls studying for GCE O-levels as an indicator of school quality (specification 5) and then
add dummy variables for school type categories (specification 6) to rule out the possibility
that the neighborhood eﬀect is merely picking up residual unobserved characteristics of lo-
cal secondary schooling. We find that the estimated eﬀect of neighborhood quality remains
21Note that among the individual-level variables, we include both arithmetic and reading test scores when
the child is 7, aiming at controlling for the child’s ability. Moreover, among the area-level controls, we include
total area population to control for agglomeration eﬀects. Indeed, any intergeneration link may be aﬀected
by diﬀerent degrees of individuals’ social networks and physical proximity.
22Also in this case, the use of cross-equation restrictions is always rejected by our data. Therefore, also
model (14) is estimated separately for children of high-educated and low-educated parents.
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statistically significant and positive. This finding of the importance of neighborhood factors
over and above secondary schooling is in line with Garner and Raudenbush (1991).
Let us discuss our results in more detail, looking at the specification that includes the
most extensive set of controls (specification 6). It appears that parental investment and
neighborhood quality both contribute positively to children’s education attainment, but the
eﬀect of parental investment seems to be more potent for children of high-educated parents
while neighborhood quality shows a more important role for children of low-educated parents.
A high level of parental eﬀort raises the average probability of having a high-educated child
by about 0.11 for high-educated parents whereas, for low-educated parental, this eﬀect is
roughly equal to 0.02. On the other hand, a one percentage point increase in the proportion of
neighbors with A- level or above raises the average probability of a successful transmission of
education by roughly 0.07 and 0.13 for high-educated and low-educated parents, respectively.
Returning to the model, it can be conjectured that this evidence is due to a high δ, that is
low-educated parents have a higher cost of eﬀort than high-educated parents.
Our results, however, should be taken with caution. The “high-skilled population” and
“parents read to child” variables are noisy measures of the underlying variables of interest,
namely “neighborhood quality” and “parental eﬀort”. The discrepancies between empirical
and theoretical variables might be diﬀerent for diﬀerent parental types. Our evidence should
thus be taken as only suggestive that the eﬀects of neighborhood quality and parental in-
vestment in the intergenerational transmission of education might diﬀer for children whose
parents are high-skilled or low-skilled. Besides, our analysis shows that parental eﬀort in
children’s education is an important channel mediating neighborhood eﬀects.
5.4 Robustness Checks
Tables 5 and 6 collect our main results when performing a series of robustness checks. Let
us start discussing the evidence contained in panel (a). If our identification strategy of
Section 5.2 is correct, this would imply that the estimates of the neighborhood eﬀect would
be positively biased in a sample of home owners. Panel (a) contains the results of this check.
Neighborhood eﬀects are clearly larger. In particular, compare to Tables 4 and 6, it appears
that the neighborhood eﬀect is more than twice as large for low-educated parents, and almost
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three times larger for high-educated parents.
In panel (b), we collect our main results, which are obtained when the analysis is per-
formed considering adopted children (of council tenants) only. This exercise addresses con-
cerns related to the possible presence of (unobserved) inherited characteristics that aﬀect a
child’s educational attainment. If cognitive ability is a heritable trait, it may be argued that
the better schooling performance of children of high-educated (high-ability) parents may be
the result of the transmission of genes for high ability rather than of parental investment.
Tables 5 and 6 show that our results remain (qualitatively) unchanged, suggesting this not
to be the whole story. Let us now turn our attention to investigating whether our results
are robust to alternative definitions of our target variables. Our analysis has already shown
that our results are not excessively sensitive to the inclusion of an extensive list of controls.
Let us now check if our evidence is specific to the definition of parental eﬀort used. Panel (c)
contains our results when using an alternative proxy for parental interest. Specifically, we
use the children’s teachers and the headmasters’ perception of parental involvement when
the child has just started school (based on parents’ telephone calls asking for information
about courses and textbooks, frequency of parental visits to the school, meetings with teach-
ers, etc...). Indeed, the school questionnaire of the NCDS sweep one (child’s age 7 in 1965)
contains the following question: “With regard to the child’s educational progress, does the
mother/father appear: over concerned about the child’s progress and/or expecting too high a
standard? Very interested? To show some interest? To show little or no interest?”, and it is
stated to put a circle around/encircle the appropriate definition (only one for each parent).23
We rank the parents according to the highest level of involvement reported for each couple.
We use a dichotomous variable taking the value of one if the parents appear over concerned
or very interest in their child’s education and zero otherwise (i.e., if they only show some or
little or no interest).24 We find that the correlation between our two alternative proxies of
23Observe that both measures of parental interest (from the parent and from the school principals) are
self reported. Parents’ education may influence how they report on their reading habits, conditional on
their actual reading habits. Similarly, the norms of the neighborhood and the school could influence how
principals report on parental involvement. Because we have school dummies and control for the percentage
of educated families in the neighborhood, we believe that these issues should not be too important.
24Consistently with the strategy adopted for our alternative indicator of parental interest, we group the
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parental eﬀort in a child’s education is quite high (equal to 0.71) and that our main results
remain roughly unchanged (Tables 5 and 6, panel (c)).
Finally, we test whether our results are robust to an alternative definition of parental
education. Let us then define parental education using the maximum number of years of
schooling of the two parents rather than using the average.25 Looking at the correspond-
ing results in Tables 5 and 6 (panel (d)), it can be seen that they do not change to any
considerable extent.
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 here]
6 Conclusion
This paper has proposed a microeconomic mechanism of neighborhood eﬀects on educational
attainment based on parents’ involvement in education. The theoretical model provides
potential interactions between residential community environment and parental investment
in a child’s education. The residential neighborhood average human capital has both a
direct and an indirect eﬀect on children’s educational attainment as it aﬀects parents’ eﬀort
in their children’s education which, in turn, plays an important role in determining the child’s
educational achievement. These potential interactions depend on the parents’ educational
level. Using an identification strategy based on council housing in big cities in Britain, our
empirical evidence supports these predictions. In particular, the eﬀect of parental investment
on children’s educational attainment seems to be more potent for high-educated parents while
neighborhood quality shows a more important role for the education attainment of children
of low-educated parents.
Our analysis may oﬀer interesting policy implications. Our analysis may indicate that
“Can’t say or inapplicable” responses (which also in this case occur in less than 2% of the cases) with the
“low involvement” category.
25The choice of a diﬀerent cutoﬀ point in terms of years of schooling to distinguish high-educated and
low-educated parents is, in principle, more problematic because consistency with the aggregation used for
cohort members’ education implies that high-educated individuals are those that left school at an age above
18, i.e. with more than 12 years of schooling (and low-skilled otherwise).
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neighborhoods matter, diﬀerentially depending on parental education. If we believe that this
is the case, then neighborhood regeneration policies would be the right tool to use. Such poli-
cies have been implemented in the US and in Europe through the enterprise zone programs
(Papke, 1994; Boarnet and Bogart, 1996; Mauer and Ott, 1999; Bondonio and Engberg,
2000; Bondonio and Greenbaum, 2007) and the empowerment zone programs (Busso and
Kline, 2008). The enterprise zone policy consists in designating a specific urban (or rural)
area, which is depressed, and targeting it for economic development through government-
provided subsidies to labor and capital. The aim of the empowerment zone program is to
revitalize distressed urban communities and it represents a nexus between social welfare
policy and economic development eﬀorts. The eﬀect on employment are mixed, with some
policies having strong eﬀects while other having no eﬀects at all.
We have also seen that the interaction between low- and high-educated families could
help the former increase the educational level of their children (peer eﬀects). If we believe
these results, any policy promoting social integration would have positive eﬀects on these
children’s educational achievement. Such policies, like the Moving to Opportunity (MTO)
programs (Katz et al., 2001; Kling et al., 2005), have been implemented in the United States.
By giving housing assistance to low-income families, the MTO programs help them relocate
to better and richer neighborhoods. It is true that in the US, the MTO experiment did not
find any eﬀects on educational outcomes (Katz et al., 2001; Kling et al., 2005) because these
programs basically moved families from extremely poor neighborhoods to poor neighborhoods
(see, in particular, Quigley and Raphael, 2008). We believe, however, that social mixing
such as the MTO programs could work in England because families are less poor and thus,
moving these families to richer areas will increase the chance for the children of increasing
their educational level because of better neighborhood quality q.
If we believe that the “reads to child” variable is a good proxy for “quality time” with
children, then we could put forward a policy that directly acts on the education of poor
parents or help them spend better time with their oﬀspring. This type of discussions is at
the heart of today’s socio-economic debate in England. Here, individual responsibility and
programmes targeting individuals are located exactly at the opposite extreme “policy-option”
distribution relative to interventions that target neighborhoods and other “aggregated” areas
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(like the enterprise zone or the MTO programs).
Finally, we found that cultural complementarity prevails. This implies that neighbor-
hoods and parental investment are not substitutes, so we would not expect improvements in
neighborhoods to be oﬀset by reductions in parental eﬀort. As a result, a mix of regeneration
and social mixing policies (which act on the neighborhood) and individual policies acting
directly on the educational eﬀort of poor parents could be promoted to improve the situation
of kids coming from low-educated families.
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Table 1 Exogenous Neighborhood Membership of Social Tenants in Cities 
 dep.var.: parental education 
 private houses council houses private houses council houses 
     
high-skilled population 0.0352*** 
(0.0102) 
0.0038 
(0.0087)) 
- - 
     
school composition - - 0.0201*** 
(0.0069) 
0.0053 
(0.0057)) 
     
Control set:     
LA dummies yes yes yes yes 
     
No. Obs. 4,746 2,598 4,746 2,598 
Notes: OLS estimated coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. Variables are expressed in logs. 
 
Table 2: Neighborhood characteristics by parental education 
-Sample of council tenants in cities- 
HEP : High educated parents; LEP: Low educated parents 
▪  neighborhood variables (Census 1971) HEP LEP 
young population (×100) Census ward proportion of persons aged less than 21 32.40 (14.00) 
33.15 
(15.12) 
total population (thousands) Census ward total residing population 5.34 (2.22) 
5.35 
(2.12) 
unemployment rate Census ward unemployed over active population 0.11 (0.05) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
activity rate Census ward active population (aged more than 15) over present population 
0.61 
(0.41) 
0.59 
(0.53) 
professional employment Census ward professional and managerial employees over active population 
0.16 
(0.11) 
0.17 
(0.13) 
unskilled employment Census ward unskilled employees over active population 0.08 (0.20) 
0.09 
(0.24) 
amenities Census ward proportion of households lacking or sharing hot water and/or inside toilet 
0.09 
(0.15) 
0.08 
(0.17) 
    
n. obs.  1,019 1,579 
Notes: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are reported. T-tests for differences between means have been 
reported.  None of the differences is statistical significant at any traditional statistical level.  
Table 3 Neighborhood education effect on parental effort 
 dep. var.: parents read to child 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 HEP LEP HEP LEP HEP LEP HEP LEP 
high-skilled population 0.1012*** 
(0.0350) 
0.0761** 
(0.0309) 
0.0910*** 
(0.0301) 
0.0655** 
(0.0272) 
0.0503*** 
(0.0177) 
0.0201** 
(0.0102) 
0.0485*** 
(0.0169) 
0.0194** 
(0.0091) 
young population 0.1543 
(0.1967) 
0.1012 
(0.1715) 
0.1233 
(0.2213) 
0.0905 
(0.1805) 
0.1201 
(0.2121) 
0.0910 
(0.1804) 
0.1203 
(0.2122) 
0.0909 
(0.1804) 
total population  0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0005) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0005) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0005) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0005) 
unemployment rate -0.2915*** 
(0.0987) 
-0.2017*** 
(0.0656) 
-0.2565** 
(0.1098) 
-0.1920** 
(0.0766) 
-0.2450** 
(0.1002) 
-0.1888** 
(0.0788) 
-0.2444** 
(0.1001) 
-0.1858** 
(0.0787) 
activity rate 0.0671 
(0.0569) 
0.0888 
(0.0787) 
0.0673 
(0.0601) 
0.0890 
(0.0790) 
0.0672 
(0.0615) 
0.0895 
(0.0799) 
0.0677 
(0.0616) 
0.0901 
(0.0800) 
professional employment 0.1015 
(0.1116) 
0.0564 
(0.1011) 
0.0881 
(0.1066) 
0.0470 
(0.1015) 
0.0730 
(0.0790) 
0.0390 
(0.0812) 
0.0711 
(0.0781) 
0.0376 
(0.0808) 
unskilled employment -0.0876 
(0.1231) 
-0.1012 
(0.1034) 
-0.0639 
(0.1021) 
-0.0909 
(0.0899) 
-0.0581 
(0.0977) 
-0.0899 
(0.0835) 
-0.0980 
(0.0977) 
-0.0995 
(0.0834) 
amenities -0.0999** 
(0.0421) 
-0.0875*** 
(0.0293) 
-0.0797** 
(0.0379) 
-0.0708*** 
(0.0252) 
-0.0798** 
(0.0366) 
-0.0710*** 
(0.0244) 
-0.0798** 
(0.0369) 
-0.0709*** 
(0.0240) 
parents income   0.0246** 
(0.0111) 
0.0541** 
(0.0257) 
0.0110** 
(0.0052) 
0.0225** 
(0.0112) 
0.0108** 
(0.0052) 
0.0200** 
(0.0101) 
parents age   0.0101 
(0.0122) 
0.0154 
(0.0149) 
0.0110 
(0.0120) 
0.0166 
(0.0159) 
0.0110 
(0.0121) 
0.0161 
(0.0148) 
parents social class   0.0012 
(0.0033) 
0.0088 
(0.0101) 
0.0007 
(0.0039) 
0.0046 
(0.0109) 
0.0007 
(0.0037) 
0.0041 
(0.0108) 
parents employed   -0.0134 
(0.0155) 
0.0255 
(0.0260) 
0.0071 
(0.0100) 
0.0099 
(0.0244) 
0.0067 
(0.0101) 
0.01059 
(0.0248) 
parents born in UK   0.0302** 
(0.0137) 
0.0454*** 
(0.0125) 
0.0290** 
(0.0140) 
0.0415*** 
(0.0138) 
0.0288** 
(0.0145) 
0.0400*** 
(0.0126) 
single parent families   0.0166 
(0.0175) 
-0.0233 
(0.0269) 
0.0171 
(0.0170) 
-0.0209 
(0.0250) 
0.0171 
(0.0170) 
-0.0209 
(0.0250) 
house size   0.0122** 
(0.0043) 
0.0178*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0129** 
(0.0048) 
0.0185*** 
(0.0065) 
0.0127** 
(0.0048) 
0.0184*** 
(0.0061) 
family size   -0.0465** 
(0.0222) 
-0.0203** 
(0.0105) 
-0.0400** 
(0.0199) 
-0.0156** 
(0.0075) 
-0.0403** 
(0.0201) 
-0.0145** 
(0.0070) 
special education   0.0534 
(0.0672) 
0.0606 
(0.0670) 
0.0330 
(0.0566) 
0.0396 
(0.0586) 
0.0320 
(0.0565) 
0.0388 
(0.0580) 
female   0.1023 
(0.1124) 
0.0983 
(0.1055) 
0.1021 
(0.1129) 
0.1090 
(0.1069) 
0.1123 
(0.1125) 
0.1087 
(0.1059) 
school composition     0.0402*** 
(0.0145) 
0.0110** 
(0.0052) 
0.0329** 
(0.0152) 
0.0100** 
(0.0050) 
school dummies no no no no no no yes yes 
LA dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Notes: Probit estimation results of model 13. Marginal effects at the sample means and standard errors in parentheses. Errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. HEP : High educated parents; LEP: 
Low educated parents. Precise list and definition of control variables are in Tables 1 and A1. Coefficients marked with one (two) [three] asterisks are significant at 10 (5) [1] percent level. 
Table 4 Neighborhood education effect on Child’s qualification 
 Dep. Var.: transition probabilities: 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
             
high-skilled population 0.2042** 
(0.0951) 
0.3595** 
(0.1520) 
0.0910*** 
(0.0302) 
0.2266*** 
(0.0727) 
0.0903*** 
(0.0307) 
0.1667*** 
(0.0550) 
0.0849*** 
(0.0292) 
0.1473*** 
(0.0421) 
0.0740*** 
(0.0256) 
0.1309*** 
(0.0348) 
0.0715*** 
(0.0232) 
0.1293*** 
(0.0245) 
parents read to child - - 0.1333*** 
(0.0329) 
0.0427** 
(0.0215) 
0.1208*** 
(0.0299) 
0.0388*** 
(0.0201) 
0.1120*** 
(0.0295) 
0.0257*** 
(0.0129) 
0.1089*** 
(0.0290) 
0.0190*** 
(0.0069) 
0.1075*** 
(0.0277) 
0.0169*** 
(0.0045) 
young population 0.1221 
(0.1777) 
0.1954 
(0.1977) 
0.1022 
(0.1555) 
0.1595 
(0.1809) 
0.0952 
(0.1459) 
0.1505 
(0.1810) 
0.0945 
(0.1450) 
0.1501 
(0.1811) 
0.0889 
(0.1224) 
0.1450 
(0.1800) 
0.0890 
(0.1224) 
0.1450 
(0.1799) 
total population  0.0004 
(0.0006) 
0.0005 
(0.0005) 
0.0004 
(0.0006) 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
0.0003 
(0.0005) 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
0.0003 
(0.0005) 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
unemployment rate -0.1529** 
(0.0719) 
-0.1620*** 
(0.0465) 
-0.1052** 
(0.0507) 
-0.1303*** 
(0.0450) 
-0.0853** 
(0.0425) 
-0.1023** 
(0.0444) 
-0.0849** 
(0.0424) 
-0.1020** 
(0.0443) 
-0.0812** 
(0.0402) 
-0.0992** 
(0.0444) 
-0.0810** 
(0.0401) 
-0.0992** 
(0.0441) 
activity rate 0.0446** 
(0.0225) 
0.0177 
(0.0178) 
0.0400* 
(0.0220) 
0.0169 
(0.0170) 
0.0405* 
(0.0225) 
0.0155 
(0.0166) 
0.0400* 
(0.0229) 
0.0151 
(0.0160) 
0.0374 
(0.0230) 
0.0125 
(0.0156) 
0.0370 
(0.0231) 
0.0123 
(0.0151) 
Professional employment 0.0815** 
(0.0404) 
0.0555** 
(0.0269)
0.0800** 
(0.0400)
0.0550** 
(0.0259)
0.0717 
(0.0399)
0.0475** 
(0.0231)
0.0715 
(0.0385)
0.0471** 
(0.0231)
0.0667 
(0.0381)
0.0462** 
(0.0229)
0.0667 
(0.0382)
0.0459** 
(0.0226)
unskilled employment -0.0387 
(0.1002) 
-0.1010 
(0.1050) 
-0.0377 
(0.0980) 
-0.1012 
(0.1056) 
-0.0389 
(0.1002) 
-0.1012 
(0.1061) 
-0.0390 
(0.1001) 
-0.1010 
(0.1062) 
-0.0383 
(0.0091) 
-0.0098 
(0.1015) 
-0.0389 
(0.0091) 
-0.0098 
(0.1014) 
amenities -0.1001*** 
(0.0369) 
-0.0787*** 
(0.0259) 
-0.0991*** 
(0.0365) 
-0.0770*** 
(0.0250) 
-0.0905*** 
(0.0307) 
-0.0708*** 
(0.0259) 
-0.0901*** 
(0.0305) 
-0.0707*** 
(0.0259) 
-0.0890*** 
(0.0301) 
-0.0695*** 
(0.0255) 
-0.0889*** 
(0.0301) 
-0.0691*** 
(0.0252) 
parents income     0.1554*** 
(0.0519) 
0.0550*** 
(0.0171) 
0.1455*** 
(0.0455) 
0.0462*** 
(0.0169) 
0.1231*** 
(0.0385) 
0.0355** 
(0.0157) 
0.1215*** 
(0.0358) 
0.0328** 
(0.0147) 
parents age     -0.0044 
(0.0107) 
-0.0077 
(0.0121) 
-0.0046 
(0.0110) 
-0.0075 
(0.0120) 
-0.0040 
(0.0106) 
-0.0070 
(0.0119) 
-0.0040 
(0.0107) 
-0.0067 
(0.0118) 
parents social class     0.0915 
(0.0898) 
0.1201 
(0.1506) 
0.0900 
(0.0899) 
0.1182 
(0.1495) 
0.0900 
(0.0878) 
0.1177 
(0.1468) 
0.0879 
(0.0869) 
0.1168 
(0.1449) 
parents employed     -0.0477 
(0.0456) 
0.0788 
(0.0699) 
0.0455 
(0.0459) 
0.0769 
(0.0669) 
0.0361 
(0.0360) 
0.0727 
(0.0617) 
0.0313 
(0.0306) 
0.0721 
(0.0612) 
parents born in UK     0.0671 
(0.1101) 
0.0569 
(0.1021) 
0.0647 
(0.1075) 
0.0506 
(0.1012) 
0.0634 
(0.1067) 
0.0500 
(0.1012) 
0.0604 
(0.1047) 
0.0485 
(0.0981) 
single parent families     -0.0875 
(0.1345) 
-0.1002 
(0.1093) 
-0.0839 
(0.1095) 
-0.1255 
(0.1090) 
-0.0783 
(0.1079) 
-0.1002 
(0.0980) 
-0.0768 
(0.1069) 
-0.1000 
(0.0974) 
house size     0.1313** 
(0.0642) 
0.1779** 
(0.0847) 
0.1454** 
(0.0670) 
0.1590** 
(0.0871) 
0.1220** 
(0.0643) 
0.1379** 
(0.0700) 
0.1215** 
(0.0632) 
0.1375** 
(0.0663) 
family size     -0.0209 
(0.0221) 
-0.0487** 
(0.0244) 
-0.0200 
(0.0211) 
-0.0445** 
(0.0220) 
-0.0122 
(0.0208) 
-0.0344 
(0.0212) 
-0.0120 
(0.0201) 
-0.0333 
(0.0202) 
female       0.2901 
(0.3209) 
0.2115 
(0.2206) 
0.2534 
(0.2698) 
0.2001 
(0.2065) 
0.2525 
(0.2687) 
0.2002 
(0.2060) 
arithmetic test score       0.0671*** 
(0.0235) 
0.0888*** 
(0.0217) 
0.0456** 
(0.0224) 
0.0528*** 
(0.0188) 
0.0446** 
(0.0220) 
0.0519*** 
(0.0182) 
reading test score       0.0115 
(0.0111) 
0.0256 
(0.0222) 
0.0099 
(0.0100) 
0.0205 
(0.0201) 
0.0085 
(0.0087) 
0.0197 
(0.0202) 
school composition         0.1016** 
(0.0511) 
0.1599*** 
(0.0489) 
0.1001** 
(0.0505) 
0.1565*** 
(0.0460) 
school dummies          no no yes yes 
LA dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Notes: Probit estimation results of model 14. Marginal effects at the sample means and standard errors in parentheses. Errors are clustered at the neighborhood level.. Precise list and definition of control variables 
are in Tables 1 and A1. Coefficients marked with one (two) [three] asterisks are significant at 10 (5) [1] percent level. 
Table 5 Neighborhood education effect on parental effort 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 dep. var.: parental effort 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
 Sample of home owners Sample of council tenants 
with adopted children 
Alternative definition of 
parental effort 
Alternative definition of 
parental education 
 HEP LEP HEP LEP HEP LEP HEP LEP 
         
high-skilled population 0.1093*** 
(0.0214) 
0.0426*** 
(0.0120) 
0.0490** 
(0.0175) 
0.0216** 
(0.0104) 
0.0502** 
(0.0247) 
0.0211** 
(0.0103) 
0.0468*** 
(0.0155) 
0.0187*** 
(0.0068) 
Control set:         
neighborhood variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
family background variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
school variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
LA dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
n. obs. 2,690 2,056 751 779 1,019 1,579 1,019 1,579 
Notes: Probit estimation results of model 13. Marginal effects at the sample means and standard errors in parentheses. Errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. HEP : High educated parents; LEP: Low educated 
parents. Precise list and definition of control variables are in Tables 1 and A1. Coefficients marked with one (two) [three] asterisks are significant at 10 (5) [1] percent level. 
 
Table 6 Neighborhood education effect on Child’s qualification 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 dep. var.: transition probabilities: 
         
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
 Sample of home owners Sample of council tenants 
with adopted children 
Alternative definition of 
parental effort 
Alternative definition of 
parental education 
         
high-skilled population 0.1998*** 
(0.0423) 
0.2639*** 
(0.0452) 
0.0700** 
(0.0297) 
0.1251*** 
(0.0302) 
0.0721*** 
(0.0243) 
0.1290*** 
(0.0255) 
0.0689*** 
(0.0225) 
0.1218*** 
(0.0236) 
         
parental effort 0.1653*** 
(0.0388) 
0.0784*** 
(0.0222) 
0.1069*** 
(0.0333) 
0.0175*** 
(0.0062) 
0.1012*** 
(0.0289) 
0.0156*** 
(0.0050) 
0.1198*** 
(0.0269) 
0.0165*** 
(0.0046) 
Control set:         
neighborhood variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
family background variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
child variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
school variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
LA dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
n. obs. 2,690 2,056 751 779 1,019 1,579 1,019 1,579 
Notes: Probit estimation results of model 14. Marginal effects at the sample means and standard errors in parentheses. Errors are clustered at the neighborhood level..Precise list and definition of control variables 
are in Tables 1 and A1. Coefficients marked with one (two) [three] asterisks are significant at 10 (5) [1] percent level. 
 
 
APPENDIX 
Table A1: Description of data 
-Sample of council tenants in cities- 
high educated parents: HEP; low educated parents: LEP 
▪ key variables  HEP LEP 
high skilled population (×100) Census ward proportion of over-18s persons with A-
levels (highest grade at age 16 exams) or above 
qualifications 
13.70 
(7.88) 
13.11 
(8.65) 
parents read to child dummy variable taking value one if the parents read at 
least every week to the child 
0.51 
(0.50) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
parental involvement dummy variable taking value one if the parents appear 
over concerned or very interested in the child's education 
0.61 
(0.48) 
0.58 
(0.49) 
parent education*** average completed years of schooling (derived from age 
left full-time education) of the mother and the father 
13.57 
(2.95) 
10.01 
(3.78) 
▪  child variables    
special education dummy variable taking value one if the child has been 
ascertained as in need of special education  
0.24 
(0.43) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
arithmetic test score** child's age-7 arithmetic test scores, coded 0 to 10 5.55 
(2.90) 
5.01 
(2.67) 
reading test score child's age-7 reading test scores, coded 0 to 30 22.04 
(6.88) 
21.66 
(6.35) 
female dummy variable taking value one if the child is female 0.45 
(0.46) 
0.55 
(0.49) 
▪  family background variables    
parents income weekly net wage of father (or mother if no father figure), 
12 bands, mid-points of each range considered 
22.15 
(13.28) 
21.85 
(12.11) 
parents age average parents' age at the childs's age 16 38.16 
(9.87) 
39.72 
(8.89) 
parents social class social class of father (or mother if no father figure), 
coded 1 to 5: unskilled, semi-skilled manual, skilled 
manual, skilled non-manual, professional 
3.10 
(2.30) 
3.07 
(1.40) 
parents employed** dummy variable taking value one if both parents are 
working 
0.57 
(0.50) 
0.46 
(0.25) 
parents born in UK dummy variable taking value one if both parents are born 
in Great Britain 
0.83 
(0.38) 
0.81 
(0.40) 
single parent families dummy variable taking value one if there is no regular 
father figure or there is no natural mother 
0.004 
(0.06) 
0.003 
(0.05) 
house size number of rooms in household accommodation 0.18 
(0.21) 
0.19 
(0.28) 
family size number of people in household 4.02 
(1.43) 
3.89 
(1.80) 
▪ school variables    
school composition proportion of boys or girls studying for GCE O-levels in 
the school attended by the child at age 16, 9 bands, coded 
1 to 9 
4.81 
(3.01) 
4.77 
(2.89) 
school grammar dummy variable taking value one if the school attended 
by the child at age 16vis grammar; school type dummies, 
reference category: comprehensive school 
0.05 
(0.23) 
0.03 
(0.19) 
school secondary modern dummy variable taking value one if the school attended 
by the child at age 16vis grammar: school type dummies. 
0.21 
(0.40) 
0.18 
(0.39) 
school private dummy variable taking value one if the school attended 
by the child at age 16 is private: school type dummies 
0.12 
(0.34) 
0.09 
(0.30) 
    
n. obs.  1,019 1,579 
Notes: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are reported. T-tests for differences between means have been reported. Variables marked with 
*, **, *** show test statistics significant at the 10, 5, 1 percent level respectively. 
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